Generals MacArthur and Blamey leave Australia's northern door open
By the end of March 1942, most of South-East Asia had been conquered by Japan's fast-moving armies, and the Japanese troops occupying Australia's Territory of New Guinea were literally on Australia's doorstep. The threat facing the Australian mainland was now a very real one. In response to the deteriorating situation, on 25 April 1942, General Douglas MacArthur issued his first directive as Supreme Commander of Allied forces in Australia. He directed that Allied Land Forces were to prevent any Japanese landing on the north-east coast of Australia or on the south coast of the island of New Guinea.
Although MacArthur's directive appeared to recognise the strategic importance of Port Moresby, and the vulnerability of northern Australia to increased aerial bombardment and invasion if it were to be captured by the Japanese, the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army, General Sir Thomas Blamey, took no immediate steps to fortify Port Moresby or reinforce inadequately trained and raw Australian militia garrisons in New Guinea with the battle-toughened AIF troops of the 7th Division who had arrived back in Australia in March 1942. Both MacArthur and Blamey had reasons for keeping the 7th Division on the Australian mainland. MacArthur wanted them kept in reserve for his planned assault on the Japanese stronghold at Rabaul. Blamey wanted to keep experienced AIF troops in Australia to meet the threat of a Japanese invasion.
Even when Kokoda had been captured, Generals MacArthur (right) and Blamey refused to heed intelligence warnings that the Japanese intended to capture Port Moresby by using the Kokoda Track across the Owen Stanleys. These elderly generals remained out of touch with the reality of the situation in New Guinea throughout the Kokoda Campaign. Their neglect contributed to the heavy loss of Australian lives on the Kokoda Track.
This neglect of the defence of Port Moresby by MacArthur and Blamey becomes even more difficult to understand in the light of evidence that the Japanese and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, were well aware of the strategic importance of Port Moresby. Nimitz had moved two of his scarce aircraft carriers, USS Lexington and USS Yorktown to New Guinea waters in early March 1942 to attack a Japanese invasion force that was being assembled at Lae for the purpose of capturing Port Moresby. Admiral Nimitz was a brilliant and bold commander, but unfortunately, his command was limited to the Pacific Area. In 1942, the South-West Pacific was still regarded by Washington as something of a backwater of World War II, and this may explain Australia being saddled with a man of MacArthur's very questionable ability as commander of this area. Detailed treatments of MacArthur's deeply flawed character and military judgment can be found elsewhere on this web-site at "Battle of the Philippines" and "MacArthur- a flawed General is given command of Australia's Defence".
In early May 1942, General MacArthur decided to build forward airbases at Milne Bay on the eastern tip of Papua and at Dobodura, a small village located several kilometres inland from Buna on the northern coast of Papua. These forward airbases were intended to facilitate capture of the Japanese stronghold at Rabaul which MacArthur saw as an essential first step to recovery of the Philippines. Both decisions would lead to Australian troops being involved in some of the bloodiest fighting of the Pacific War. Having finally been made aware of the seriousness of the Japanese threat to Port Moresby by the Battle of the Coral Sea (7-8 May 1942), MacArthur requested additional Australian troops to bolster the weak defences of Port Moresby. However, instead of moving seasoned troops of the AIF 7th Division to Port Moresby, Blamey responded to MacArthur's request by assigning the 14th Militia Brigade to Port Moresby.
At this time when MacArthur and Blamey were finally recognising the need to strengthen Australia's defences in Papua, they were warned by American naval intelligence in Melbourne (FRUMEL) that the next attempt by the Japanese to capture Port Moresby was likely to be an overland attack by crossing the Owen Stanley Range. This prediction came from analysis of intercepted Japanese military signals by the same code-breakers who had accurately predicted the nature and timing of the first Japanese attempt to capture Port Moresby by a seaborne invasion force. That intelligence warning had enabled Admiral Nimitz to block the Japanese invasion in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Despite the accuracy of the Coral Sea warning, MacArthur and Blamey chose to ignore the warning by Allied code-breakers of a likely Japanese overland attack on Port Moresby.
In early July 1942, Allied intelligence became aware from signal intercepts that the Japanese were interested in the Gona-Buna area of northern Papua and the Milne Bay area. In the context of Japan's known determination to capture Port Moresby, MacArthur heeded the warning from intelligence on this occasion and decided that it was necessary to strengthen the defences at Milne Bay. He requested an Australian brigade to defend the Milne Bay airbase, and Blamey assigned the task to the 7th Militia Brigade which received orders on 7 July 1942 to embark for Milne Bay.
Despite intelligence warnings that the Japanese were likely to mount an overland attack on Port Moresby, MacArthur and Blamey believed that the towering, heavily forested mountains of the Owen Stanley Range would prove impassable for a large body of Japanese troops, especially as there were no roads across this formidable natural barrier. Comforted by this delusion, they appear to have overlooked the manner in which tough, jungle-trained Japanese troops had overcome natural obstacles of jungle and mountain to defeat Allied armies and reach Australia's doorstep in New Guinea. They also appear to have overlooked the fierce determination of the Japanese to capture Port Moresby. Having inexcusably blinded themselves to reality, MacArthur and Blamey took no steps to provide Port Moresby with adequate military defences to resist a determined Japanese overland attack.
The Japanese exploit the open Doorway to Port Moresby
On 21 July 1942, an advance force variously estimated at between 1,500-2,000 Japanese troops landed near the village of Gona on the northern coast of Papua. The immediate aims of this force were to secure the coastal strip between Gona and the nearby village of Buna, reconnoitre the area between Gona and the Australian administrative post at Kokoda, seize Kokoda and its vital airstrip, and assess the practicability of using the Kokoda Track as a route for Japanese troops to capture Port Moresby. If the overland route was deemed practicable, a much larger Japanese force would quickly follow.
The Japanese advance force included a battalion of troops from the 144th Regiment of Japan's elite South Seas Detachment and a company of elite Japanese marines of the 5th Sasebo Naval Landing Force. These combat troops were all battle-hardened veterans of jungle warfare in South-East Asia. Their task was to deal with any Australian troops who might be found on the route to Kokoda, or at Kokoda. Unlike the militia troops whom they would soon face, these Japanese combat troops were very heavily armed and equipped with mortars.
Despite receiving some initial attention from Allied aircraft, the Japanese quickly established a beachhead and protected it with anti-aircraft batteries. Troops of the South Seas Detachment and the Sasebo Naval Landing Force then moved inland along a jungle track towards Kokoda village which is situated on the northern foothills of the Owen Stanleys.
Before they reached Kokoda, the advancing Japanese came into contact with two forward platoons from B Company of the 39th Australian Infantry Battalion. This single infantry company, numbering about 95 troops, had been assigned the dangerous task of crossing the Owen Stanley Range and defending Kokoda airstrip against the Japanese. Finding themselves outnumbered by at least five to one, the militia troops staged a fighting rearguard withdrawal towards Kokoda.
A casual response by military leaders in Australia to the Japanese landing in Papua
When Generals MacArthur and Blamey were informed that a large formation of Japanese troops had landed at Gona on the northern coast of Papua, they were not greatly concerned. MacArthur's mind was unwaveringly focussed on the recovery of the Philippines, and the Japanese were not supposed to interfere with his planning to achieve that end. Following a pattern established in the Philippines debacle, MacArthur chose to ignore the danger because it did not suit him to acknowledge inconvenient realities. As in the Philippines, he had surrounded himself in Australia with staff officers who lacked combat experience almost to a man and who were aware of this dangerous weakness and indulged it.
General Blamey at least had the good sense to order Morris to send the remaining companies of the 39th Battalion across the Owen Stanleys to join B Company at Kokoda. Blamey appreciated that the Japanese might probe in the direction of Kokoda, but he believed that their main purpose in landing a large force at Gona was simply to establish a forward base at either Gona or Buna. It does not appear to have occurred to either MacArthur or Blamey that Kokoda, and ultimately Port Moresby, were the likely targets of the Japanese landing. Morris ordered the commander of the 39th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Owen, to fly to Kokoda on 24 July and then prepare to defend Kokoda with his battalion, which was to be given the name "Maroubra Force". Fortunately for Australia, the 39th Battalion was led by experienced AIF officers and NCOs.
