Was this man really a kindly "Uncle Tojo" to Australia in 1942? James Bowen says, "No".

In January and February 1942, Japanese Prime Minister, General Hideki Tojo, demanded that Australia surrender to Japan. When Australia ignored his demands, General Tojo set in train a plan to isolate Australia completely from all American help. This plan was called Operation FS, and it was intended to compel Australia's surrender to Japan by means of isolation, blockade, bombing, and psychological warfare. Assuming that Australia would surrender to Japan, Tojo assigned to the Total War Institute in Tokyo the planning to incorporate Australia into Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Despite clear historical evidence of these hostile plans, and a series of major battles to implement them in 1942, the former senior historian at the Australian War Memorial, Dr Peter Stanley, and the director of the Memorial, Major General Steve Gower, deny that Australia faced grave peril from Japan in 1942. Samples of this denial can be found in the quotations below, and total contradiction of this unsubstantiated revisionism can be found in the chapters mentioned.

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WHAT ARE DR PETER STANLEY REVISIONIST CLAIMS?

I suspect that Dr Peter Stanley's controversial views on the degree of peril faced by Australia in 1942 and his criticism of the character and leadership of wartime Prime Minister John Curtin reflect a trendy postmodern approach to history that seeks to undermine great achievements that inspire a nation.

Based on my academic training in Far Eastern history and my specialist study of Pacific War history over several decades, I will undertake to prove beyond reasonable doubt in the following and related chapters that denial of the gravity of the danger facing Australia from Japan in 1942 and associated criticism of the character and leadership of Prime Minister John Curtin by Dr Stanley, self-styled "military social historian" and former senior historian at the Australian War Memorial have no credible historical foundation.

I will deal with each of Dr Peter Stanley's main revisionist claims in turn, and then show that each of those claims has no credible historical foundation to support it.

Dr Stanley's extraordinary revisionist claims including the following:

Revisionist Claim 1: There was no Japanese plan to invade Australia in 1942.

On this theme, Dr Stanley has said:

"There was no Japanese plan to invade Australia".

[This text is drawn from Dr Stanley's speech to the "Remembering 1942" conference held at the Australian War Memorial in 2002]

" By March 1942 the idea of an invasion of Australia had been dropped. It had never been more than an idea discussed by a handful of (middle-ranking naval staff) officers in Tokyo".

[This text is drawn from a display in the World War II gallery of the Australian War Memorial. The words reflect Dr Stanley's views as set out in his essay "He's (not) coming South: the invasion that wasn't"(2002)]

Dr Stanley's claim that "there was no Japanese plan to invade Australia" in 1942 is untrue.

Despite holding a senior appointment as historian in the Australian War Memorial, with access to extensive historical resources, Dr Peter Stanley appears to be totally ignorant of the fact that Japan's military leaders were planning to compel Australia's surrender to Japan in 1942. Japanese planning for a limited invasion of the Australian mainland reached the highest levels of Japan's Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry in December 1941. In reference to this, the distinguished historian and Japan scholar Professor Henry Frei states:

"To prevent this (Australia becoming a base for the American counter-offensive), the Navy General Staff sought as early as December (1941) to press for control over all of Australia as a major 'stage two' war objective. This would be achieved by invading the strategically most important points on the northern and north-eastern coasts of Australia. Japan would there annihilate the enemy's maritime forces, cut the American-Australian line of communication, and thereby deal the entire Australian nation a thorough blow....The Navy General Staff calculated in its early requests in December 1941 that three divisions (between 45,000 and 60,000 men) would suffice to capture and annihilate the Australian fleet and to secure the flanks and center of the northeastern and northwestern Australian coastlines." See Frei, Japan's Southward Advance and Australia, at pages 163-164. The emphasis is mine.

At a meeting of the Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo on 4 March 1942, the Navy invasion plan for Australia was opposed by the Army generals who refused to provide the twelve divisions that they believed would be needed for a successful invasion of Australia. The Japanese generals were very conscious of the danger that Australia posed for Japan as a potential base for the inevitable American counter-offensive following Pearl Harbor, and they intended to deny the United States access to Australia by neutralising the vast southern continent. The Japanese generals argued that Australia could be pressured into surrender to Japan by severing its lifeline to the United States together with intensified blockade, bombing, and psychological warfare. The Japanese plan to isolate Australia from all American aid called for establishment of a chain of Japanese bases stretching across the Pacific from Port Moresby to Fiji and Samoa, and it was given the code reference "Operation FS". The Japanese Army plan to compel Australia's surrender had the support of Japan's Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo.The Japanese Navy agreed to its limited invasion plan for Australia being deferred in favour of the Army plan to compel Australia's surrender to Japan. This agreement was confirmed at a Liaison Conference at Imperial General Headquarters on 7 March 1942, and formally ratified at another Liaison Conference on 11 March. On 15 March 1942, top priority was given by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters to the Japanese Army plan to compel Australia's surrender to Japan by implementation of Operation FS.

I find it difficult to see how an Australian surrender to Japan could serve Japan's purposes without some form of Japanese occupation or control of the mainland that would exclude access to Australia by the United States. In fact, as will be mentioned below, the Japanese government intended to incorporate Australia, after its surrender, as a puppet state in Japan's New Order in Greater East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Japan's planning to compel Australia's surrender in 1942 did not rule out invasion by force of arms if Australia refused to surrender.

Dr Peter Stanley demonstrates his failure to understand the structure and functioning of Japan's military high command and its strategic aims and war planning in 1942 in a paper delivered by him at the "Remembering 1942" conference. The following extract is from "He's (not) coming South: the invasion that wasn't"(2002):

"In the euphoria of victory early in 1942 some visionary middle-ranking naval staff officers in Tokyo proposed that Japan should go further. In February and March they proposed that Australia should be invaded, in order to forestall it being used as a base for an Allied counteroffensive (which of course it became). The plans got no further than some acrimonious discussions. The Army dismissed the idea as 'gibberish', knowing that troops sent further south would weaken Japan in China and in Manchuria against a Soviet threat. Not only did the Japanese army condemn the plan, but the Navy General Staff also deprecated it, unable to spare the million tons of shipping the invasion would have consumed. By mid-March the proposal lapsed....This conclusion is supported by all the scholarship, notably the late and much missed Henry Frei, whose Japan's Southward Advance and Australia documents the debate and its conclusion from Japanese official and private sources."The emphasis is mine.

There are five major historical errors in this statement, followed by an erroneous conclusion. The historical errors are (1) the claim that Japanese planning to invade Australia in 1942 "got no further than some acrimonious discussions" involving only "middle-ranking naval staff officers" in Tokyo; (2) the claim that the "Army dismissed the idea as 'gibberish' "; (3) the claim that "the Navy General Staff also deprecated it"; (4) the claim the the Japanese Navy was "unable to spare the million tons of shipping the invasion would have consumed"; and (5) the claim that "By mid-March the proposal lapsed".

In making these claims, Dr Stanley professes to rely heavily on the work of the distinguished historian and Japan scholar Professor Henry Frei as set out in his authoritative "Japan's Southward Advance and Australia". I found nothing in Professor Frei's book to support Dr Stanley's claim that only "middle-ranking naval staff officers" were proposing an invasion of Australia in 1942, and his claim that "The plans got no further than some acrimonious discussions." On the contrary, Professor Frei provides very clear evidence that a limited invasion of the northern Australian mainland was being planned and proposed at the highest level of Japan's Navy General Staff through December 1941, and January and February 1942. Professor Frei tells us (at page 172) that the Japanese Navy's limited invasion plan was deferred in favour of an even more alarming Japanese Army plan to "throttle Australia into submission" to Japan. This surrender to Japan would be achieved by severing Australia's lifeline to the United States, and then pressuring Australia into full surrender to Japan by intensified naval blockade, bombardment, and psychological warfare (page 172). Professor Frei makes it clear from his book and at least one published paper that Australians had much to fear from Japanese planning to compel Australia's surrender in 1942, including the loss of their country's independence and forced acceptance of the status of a Japanese puppet state.

Dr Stanley has his facts totally mixed up when he claims "the Navy General Staff also deprecated it, unable to spare the million tons of shipping the invasion would have consumed." As pointed out above, the Japanese Navy high command supported a limited invasion of the northern Australian mainland in 1942. It was the Japanese Army that blocked the Japanese Navy invasion plan. It was the Japanese Army that controlled the troop transports and merchant ships that would be needed to transport twelve divisions to Australia and keep them suppled.

The Navy plan did not "lapse" as Dr Stanley claims. It was deferred and effectively subsumed under the Imperial Army's plan to pursue an Australian surrender to Japan.

Dr Peter Stanley ends this extract by saying: "This conclusion is supported by all the scholarship, notably the late and much missed Henry Frei..". Dr Stanley is wrong again. In the related chapter "Japan's Navy proposes a limited invasion of the northern Australian mainland", I have demonstrated by reference to the authoritative text of distinguished historian and Japan scholar Professor Henry Frei that these claims by Dr Stanley have no historical foundation. In that chapter, I have also demonstrated that Dr Stanley's denial that planning to invade Australia in 1942 reached and was approved at the highest levels of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Navy Ministry is refuted by highly persuasive Japanese authority, including the official Japanese war history Senshi Sosho and leading Japanese military historian Hiroyuki Shindo, Assistant Professor, Military History Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo.

In the chapter "The Japanese Army plan to "throttle Australia into submission to Japan", again by reference to the authoritative text of Professor Frei, I have set out evidence that the Japanese Army was planning to isolate Australia from American aid by means of Operation FS in 1942, and then force Australia's surrender to Japan by intensified blockade and psychological warfare.

Revisionist Claim 2: Australia did not face a grave threat from Japan in 1942.

On this theme, Dr Stanley has written:

Australia's war in 1942 did not involve "deliverance from a Japanese threat".

Australians who want to believe that their country faced a grave threat from Japan in 1942 are" rather pathetic".

These insensitive and insulting claims are made in Dr Peter Stanley's essay "Threat made manifest" (2005), and they are drawn from the following text extracts:

"John Curtin, Australia's prime minister since October 1941, warned the Australian people that 'the fall of Singapore opens the battle for Australia'. 'Battle for Australia' committees have recently appropriated this phrase, seeking to redefine Australia's war around the idea of a deliverance from a Japanese threat." The emphasis has been added.

"It seems to be that Australians want to believe that they were part of a war, that the war came close; that it mattered...Set against the prosaic reality, the desire is poignant and rather pathetic.

Having proclaimed his English birth at the beginning of this essay "Threat made manifest", Dr Peter Stanley speaks dismissively about Australia's perilous situation throughout 1942 as repeated attacks aimed at Australia by Japan were repulsed by American and Australian forces. Dr Stanley compounds the insult to Australians by dismissing their belief that their country faced grave peril from Japan in 1942 as "pathetic". Is it possible that Dr Stanley fails to appreciate that his denial that Australia was delivered from a Japanese threat in 1942 is calculated to undermine the honour owed by Australians to those who defended Australia at a time of great peril for our nation in 1942, and especially, those who lost their lives in doing so? I believe that anyone who lived through Japan's deadly air, land, and sea attacks on Australia in 1942, or lost family or friends in those attacks, would be likely to find English-born Dr Stanley's revisionism, as reflected in these statements, utterly bizarre and deeply offensive. As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, it should be a matter for great concern that the bureaucracy of the Australian War Memorial appears to support Dr Stanley's controversial revisionism.

I urge viewers to read "Threat made manifest" (2005). I gained a clear impression from the overly defensive tenor of this rambling essay that Dr Stanley had been stung by criticism of the earlier essay by him on the same theme called "He's (not) coming South - the invasion that wasn't" (2002. In my opinion, the tone of his second essay is unnecessarily offensive to Australians. I felt that I detected in this second essay not objectivity but a rather childish desire to lash out and wound those who had hurt his feelings by their criticism. This impression was strengthened by what I felt to be sneering overtones in Dr Stanley's reference to Australian beliefs concerning the gravity of the peril faced by their country in 1942 which he describes as "rather pathetic".

If Dr Peter Stanley has any qualifications to make outrageous statements of this kind, I am not aware of them. I can accept that Dr Peter Stanley may have knowledge of some aspects of Australia's military history, perhaps the Boer War or World War I, but I could detect no depth of knowledge of the Pacific War 1941-45 in any of his published papers on this theme.

It appears to have totally escaped the notice of Dr Stanley that the fate of Australia hung in the balance throughout 1942, and especially, during the crucial battles of Coral Sea, Midway, Kokoda, and Guadalcanal. I have explained for the particular benefit of Dr Stanley why this is so in the chapter "He was coming South -To compel Australia's surrender to Japan".

If Dr Stanley cannot bring himself to accept my views, the extreme gravity of the danger from Japan in 1942 is confirmed in the quotation below from the internationally respected Australian Pacific War historian, Professor David Horner:

"The Allied successes on the Kokoda Track, at Milne Bay, and on Guadalcanal ensured the security of Australia...If Port Moresby had been taken by General Horii's troops advancing over the Kokoda Track, the whole strategic situation would have been transformed. In that sense, Kokoda was the most important battle fought by Australians in the Second World War... during 1942 Australia was in great peril. The Allied policy of 'Beat Hitler First' meant that Australia faced the prospect of a Japanese invasion with only limited support from the United States."

From "Defending Australia in 1942" by Dr David Horner, Professor of Australian Defence History, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. The Japanese withdrawal from Guadalcanal in early February 1943 signalled the failure and end of Japan's strategic plan to force Australia to surrender. This Japanese strategic plan carried the code reference Operation FS.

To better appreciate the extreme gravity of the Japanese threat to Australia in 1942, I urge viewers to read my account of the Japanese threat in the chapter "He was coming South -To compel Australia's surrender to Japan"

This revisionist claim by Dr Peter Stanley undermines the rationale for a Battle for Australia Commemoration

When I read Dr Peter Stanley's second essay "Threat made manifest" (2005), I felt certain that his rejection of the gravity of the threat to Australia in 1942 was intended to undermine the rationale for national commemorations of the Battle for Australia that have been held since 1999. I believe that this conclusion is clearly open from the wording of the two quotations under Revisionist Claim 2, and it appears to me that Dr Stanley has unequivocally confirmed his intention to undermine commemoration of the Battle for Australia in his third essay on this theme "Was there a Battle for Australia" (2006). I have mentioned in the preceding chapter that the Australian War Memorial bureaucracy appears to support Dr Stanley in challenging publicly the rationale for an established national commemoration approved by Prime Minister John Howard, and supported by the Australian Government, the Federal Opposition, and the Returned and Services League of Australia (RSL).

Despite the persistent undermining of a Battle for Australia Commemoration, and impugning of the leadership and character of Prime Minister John Curtin by Australian War Memorial bureaucrats, the Minister for Veterans' Affairs, the Honourable Alan Griffin MP, announced in a media release dated 14 February 2008 that the Rudd Government would declare the first Wednesday in September a national day of observance of the Battle for Australia.

Revisionist Claim 3: The greatly outnumbered Australian Diggers who suffered very heavy casualties repelling the determined Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track towards Port Moresby do not deserve to be called "the men who saved Australia";

On this theme, Dr Stanley has written:

"Now, we are told, the Australian Militia and AIF who met and defeated the Japanese in Papua were the men who saved Australia".

"...In fact, of course, there was no (Japanese) invasion; there was never going to be an invasion."

The first quotation is drawn from Dr Peter Stanley's essay "Threat made manifest". Having described Australians who believed that their nation faced grave peril from Japan in 1942 as "rather pathetic" and the bombing that shattered Darwin on 19 February 1942 as "small beer", this English-born historian appears determined to scale new heights of offensiveness to Australians when he makes this dismissive reference to the heroism of heavily outnumberred and outgunned Australian soldiers who suffered very heavy casualties repulsing the determined advance of an elite Japanese army along the Kokoda Track towards Port Moresby. In the context of "Threat made manifest" (2005), it appears clear to me that Dr Stanley is saying that the Australian Diggers who saved Port Moresby on the Kokoda Track do not deserve to be described as "the men who saved Australia".

In using the words "Now we are told.." in the quotation above, Dr Stanley was referring to the published works of distinguished Pacific War historians such as Dr Peter Brune and Dr David Day. Speaking about Peter Brune, Dr Stanley refers to him as "a historian who ought to know better".

Dr Peter Stanley fails to appreciate that Japanese occupation of Port Moresby would have exposed much of northern Australia to intensive Japanese bombing and facilitated the Japanese plan ["Operation FS"] to compel Australia's surrender to Japan by severing its vital lifeline to the United States. In assessing the weight, if any, that can be given to Dr Stanley's controversial views, it is useful to repeat here what Professor David Horner said (above) with specific reference to the Kokoda Campaign:

"The Allied successes on the Kokoda Track, at Milne Bay, and on Guadalcanal ensured the security of Australia...If Port Moresby had been taken by General Horii's troops advancing over the Kokoda Track, the whole strategic situation would have been transformed. In that sense, Kokoda was the most important battle fought by Australians in the Second World War".

To enable appreciation of the extreme gravity of the Japanese threat to Australia from the capture of Port Moresby in 1942, I have provided a treatment of this issue in the chapter "He was coming South -To compel Australia's surrender to Japan". That chapter also contains links to more detailed treatments of aspects of the grave Japanese threat to Australia in 1942.

"...In fact, of course, there was no (Japanese) invasion; there was never going to be an invasion."

The second claim is pure nonsense. It appears to have totally escaped the notice of Dr Peter Stanley and the Australian War Memorial bureaucracy that Australia was invaded by the Japanese on 21 July 1942 when Japanese troops landed at Buna and Gona on the northern coast of what was then the Australian Territory of Papua.*

* Britain transferred ownership of Papua to Australia in 1906. Unlike the Territory of New Guinea, Papua was never a League of Nations Mandate.

In fact, the whole Kokoda Campaign was fought on what was then Australian soil, and to oust the invading Japanese from Australian soil. This Japanese invasion of Australia ended when the Japanese were defeated in Papua on 22 January 1943 after six months of some of the bloodiest and most difficult land fighting of the Pacific War. Australia lost 2,165 troops killed and 3,533 wounded. The United States lost 671 troops killed and 2,172 wounded. The heroism of young Australian soldiers on the Kokoda Track and at Milne Bay saved Australia from invasion and a grave threat to the mainland. In the hope that he may begin to understand real Pacific War history, I have explained the nature of this threat for Dr Stanley in the chapter: "He was coming South -To compel Australia's surrender to Japan".

Australia exercised full sovereignty over Papua from 1906 until it achieved independence from Australia in 1975.

Revisionist Claim 4: The Japanese were not planning to make Australia part of their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

On this theme, Dr Stanley has said:

"The Japanese never planned to make Australia part of its Co-Prosperity Sphere". (sic)

Dr Peter Stanley made this claim in an introductory speech to a "Remembering 1942" conference at the Australian War Memorial in 2002.

I assume that by referring to "Co-prosperity Sphere", Dr Peter Stanley probably means Japan's "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere". That was not ostensibly a plan for conquest but a statement of economic imperialism announced to the world by Japan's Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke on 1 August 1940. The plan entailed creation of an economic bloc of East Asian and western Pacific nations centred on Japan. Japan would draw raw materials from these nations, and the latter would be expected to take manufactured products from Japan in return. Although they did not say so publicly, the Japanese did not view this plan as being negotiable.

If Dr Stanley was in fact referring to Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, he is again contradicted by the distinguished historian and Japan scholar Professor Henry Frei who claims Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo was planning to incorporate Australia as a puppet state in Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Professor Frei referred to countries that Japan intended to include in its Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in his paper "Why the Japanese were in New Guinea" delivered at the Australian National University conference "Remembering the War in New Guinea", held at Canberra from 19 to 21 October 2000. In this paper Professor Frei said:

"The Total War Institute's elaborate "Draft of basic plans for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, dated 27 January 1942, divided the super sphere into Inner Sphere (Japan, Manchukuo, North China); [19] the Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere (Eastern Siberia, China, and soto nan'yo [South-East Asia]); and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Australia, India, and the Pacific islands, and conceivably also New Guinea). [20]" The emphasis is mine.

The Total War Research Institute, under the direction of Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku, was required by Prime Minister General Tojo to prepare plans for administration of countries brought as puppet states into Japan's New Order in Greater East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

I have refuted this claim by Dr Peter Stanley in greater detail in the chapter "Japan's hostile plans for Australia after surrender".

Revisionist Claim 5: Wartime Prime Minister John Curtin exaggerated the threat from Japan in 1942 for political gain or because he was unable to cope with the stress of office in wartime.

On this theme, Dr Stanley has said:

"Curtin is hailed as the 'Saviour of Australia'. He saved Australia from a threat that was never real, and he knew it."
[This text is drawn from Dr Peter Stanley's introductory speech to the "Remembering 1942" conference at the Australian War Memorial in 2002. This outrageous claim is shown to be false and unfair in the later chapter "Defending the character and leadership of Prime Minister John Curtin from unjustified slurs"]

"I'm arguing that there was in fact no invasion plan, that the Curtin government exaggerated the threat, and that the enduring consequence of its deception was to skew our understanding of the reality of the invasion crisis of 1942."
[Ignoring historical evidence, Dr Peter Stanley speaks dismissively of the Japanese threat to Australia in 1942 and impugns the character and leadership of wartime Prime Minister John Curtin. The text is drawn from Dr Stanley's essay: "He's (not) coming South - the invasion that wasn't" (2002)]

"What explains Curtin's anxiety?..An actual danger of invasion had never existed...Why did Curtin continue to bang the invasion drum?...a deeper answer seems to lurk in Curtin's psyche...that he was unable to accept the reality."
Dr Peter Stanley raises another false possibility, namely, that pressure of wartime leadership may have caused Curtin to become irrational and led to his exaggeration of the threat from Japan in 1942. This quote is from: "He's (not) coming South - the invasion that wasn't" (2002)

I have mentioned in an earlier chapter that I could find no evidence of substantial historical research in any of Dr Peter Stanley's three essays on this theme that was capable of supporting his revisionist denial of the grave Japanese threat to Australia in 1942. Having shown this to be so, it could perhaps be argued that the credibilty of Dr Peter Stanley in regard to this issue has been irretrievably destroyed, and consequently, that it is unnecessary to deal with the credibility of his attacks on the character and wartime leadership of Prime MInister John Curtin.

However, it is necessary to make the point that Dr Stanley's denial of the gravity of the Japanese threat to Australia in 1942 and his denigration of Prime Minister Curtin appear to have the support of the director of the Australian War Memorial, Major General Steve Gower*, and appear to have the support of members of the Council of the Australian War Memorial which extended Major General Gower's term as director in February 2007 despite his public support for Dr Stanley's controversial revisionism.
* See fourth quotation above photograph of Prime Minister General Tojo.

Did wartime Prime Minister John Curtin dishonestly exaggerate the Japanese threat to Australia in 1942?

I believe that Dr Stanley's revisionist criticisms of Prime Minister John Curtin's wartime leadership and character are completely unjustified because they appear to be are based on a deeply flawed appreciation of Australia's strategic situation in 1942. I will explain my reasons for reaching this conclusion in the next chapter "Defending the character and leadership of Prime Minister John Curtin from unjustified slurs".

Revisionist Claim 6: There is no historical evidence that there was ever a battle for Australia in the literal sense, and it follows that commemoration of a Battle for Australia is nothing more than an emotional response to something that never happened.

On this theme, Dr Stanley has written:

There was no Japanese "grand plan" aimed at Australia in 1942;

"...there was no 'Battle for Australia' as such."

[These quotes are drawn from a speech delivered by Dr Stanley at the Australian War Memorial in 2006. By taking this bizarre stance, the Australian War Memorial is denying clear historical evidence and challenging declared support for commemoration of the Battle for Australia 1942-43 from the Australian Government and all major Australian political parties]

In the first quote from his last rambling essay on this theme "Was there a Battle for Australia?" (2006), Dr Peter Stanley reveals a monumental ignorance of Japanese and American Pacific War strategies in 1942. As if determined to prove that he has no understanding of the strategic aims and war planning of Japan's military high command in 1942 that would enable him to evaluate correctly its hostile plans for Australia, Dr Stanley makes the ludicrous claim that there was no Japanese "grand plan" aimed at Australia in 1942. Dr Stanley appears to be blissfully unaware that Japan's "Operation FS" was a "grand plan" intended to sever Australia's lifeline to the United States and compel its surrender to Japan. See the chapter "Operation FS - The Japanese Army plan to "throttle Australia into submission to Japan in 1942".

Having made no attempt to grapple with the evidence and arguments on this web-site that show the preceding five revisionist claims lack any credible historical foundation, Dr Peter Stanley appears to have been driven by desperation to claim in "Was there a Battle for Australia?" (2006) that there is no historical evidence that there was ever a battle for Australia in the literal sense, and it follows that commemoration of a Battle for Australia is nothing more than an emotional response to something that never happened. This essay was delivered as a speech at the Australian War Memorial and with the apparent approval of the director, Major General Steve Gower. I will have more to say about Major General Gower's role in this below.

Despite my invitation to Major General Gower in December 2005 to provide me with any credible evidence that supports Dr Peter Stanley's denial of the gravity of the Japanese threat to Australia in 1942, and my promise to publish any such evidence produced to me on this web-site, the Australian War Memorial has never responded to my claim that Dr Stanley's earlier essays on this theme misrepresented the work and views of the distinguished historian and Japan scholar Professor Henry Frei. However, I find it significant that Professor Frei receives no mention in Dr Stanley's third essay "Was there a Battle for Australia?".

The gossamer-thin arguments put forward by Dr Peter Stanley to support his claim that "there was no 'Battle for Australia' as such" include the alleged failure of the Japanese and Americans to refer to a "Battle for Australia" in 1942. It would be astonishing if the Japanese used such a term; for them the strategic plan to sever Australia's lifeline to the United States and force Australia's surrender to Japan was comprehended by the code reference Operation FS. For the Americans, strategic naval operations in the Pacific in 1942 were comprehended under the "Pacific War Campaign Plan". In an apparent act of desperation, Dr Stanley tosses in the claim that Australia's official war historians did not refer to a Battle for Australia*, even though the term was coined by Prime Minister Curtin. However, it is doubtful whether the official war historians were acquainted with the full extent of Japan's hostile plans for Australia in 1942. We had to wait until 1991 for Professor Frei to publish the results of his extensive research in Japanese archives in the authoritative work "Japan's Southward Advance and Australia".
* The official histories were published between 1952 and 1977.

To demonstrate the absurdity of this denial by the Australian War Memorial of Japan's hostile plans for Australia in 1942 that produced the Battle for Australia, I will quote what I said in an earlier chapter "What was the Battle for Australia?" about the rationale for commemorating a Battle for Australia:

"We were aware from research by the distinguished Japan scholar Professor Henry Frei* that the major Japanese offensive against Australia that began with the Battle of the Coral Sea (7-8 May 1942) had two purposes. The first was to sever Australia's lines of communication with the United States, and thereby, deny the Americans access to Australia as a base from which they could launch a counter-offensive against Japan. The second purpose was to deny American support to Australia and compel Australia to surrender to Japan. At the time of the Battle of the Coral Sea, Australia had already ignored two demands for its surrender made by Japanese Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo in the Diet in January and February 1942.

* Author of the definitive work on Japan's hostile plans for Australia in 1942 "Japan's Southward Advance and Australia" (1991) Melbourne University Press.

"What became the Battle for Australia was not contemplated by the Japanese high command as part of the First Operational Stage of Japan's campaign of military conquest that began with Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Australia was included in the Second Operational Stage at the behest of Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue who was commander of the 4th Fleet, or South Seas Force, based at Truk in Japan's Caroline Islands League Mandate.

"Admiral Inoue was responsible for absorbing and defeating an expected American counter-offensive against the Japanese-held Marshall and Caroline island groups, but he warned the Navy General Staff of the grave danger that Japan would face if the Americans were allowed to establish bases in Australia and its New Guinea Territories for their inevitable counter-offensive. Inoue urged an offensive against Australia and the British Solomons to counter this danger. His arguments were accepted by Navy General Staff and ultimately adopted by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters. See the chapter "Before Pearl Harbor, Japan targets Australia's New Guinea Territories".

"Japan's Imperial General Headquarters assigned the code reference "Operation FS" to the offensive directed against Australia and the British Solomon Islands. The Japanese Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo (and his generals) believed that the severing of Australia's lifeline to the United States produced by Operation FS, together with a tightening blockade, intensified bombing, and increased psychological warfare, would compel Australia to surrender to Japan.* The US Navy strategy in the South-West Pacific in 1942 was primarily directed to preventing the Japanese occupying Australia, its New Guinea mainland territories, and the southern Solomon Islands in order to preserve them as bases from which the United States could launch counter-offensives against Japan.** Control of access to Australia was considered vital by both the Japanese and Americans in 1942, and both were determined to prevent the enemy gaining that access.** The Battle of the Coral Sea and the Kokoda Campaign were initiated by the Japanese in 1942 to gain control of Australia by implementing Operation FS. On 7 August 1942, the US Navy initiated the Guadalcanal Campaign to block Japanese control of the southern Solomon Islands which would threaten American lines of communication with Australia.

* See Professor Henry P. Frei, Japans Southward Advance and Australia, (1991) MUP, Melbourne, at pp. 160-174.
** Richard B. Frank provides an excellent account of US Navy and Japanese Navy South Pacific strategies in 1942 in his magisterial work Guadalcanal, (1990) Random House at pages 1-32.

"In seeking to deny that there was a Battle for Australia, in the sense of control of access to Australia, Dr Peter Stanley and the Australian War Memorial bureaucracy appear to have no appreciation of these very important strategic considerations that shaped the course of the Pacific War from January to December 1942."

By taking this bizarre stance (Revisionist Claim 6) that undermines commemoration of the Battle for Australia, the Australian War Memorial is denying clear historical evidence and challenging declared support for commemoration of the Battle for Australia 1942-43 from the Australian Government, the Federal Opposition, and veterans organisations, including the RSL.

Should Dr Peter Stanley and the Australian War Memorial apologise to Australians?

This question can fairly be asked. Denial of the gravity of the Japanese threat to Australia in 1942 raises a very serious issue for Australians because such a denial promotes a false history of Australia's most perilous year and diminishes the honour owed to those who repulsed the deadly Japanese attacks on Australia in 1942 and the sacrifices made by them.

I believe that I have demonstrated here that Dr Peter Stanley and the Australian War Memorial have been promoting a false history of 1942 through error or inadequate scholarship, or both. Whatever may be the reason, I believe that Dr Stanley owes an apology to the people of Australia.

In my opinion, consideration of the need for apologies cannot end with Dr Peter Stanley who has now resigned from the Australian War Memorial. It appears that Dr Stanley's controversial revisionism continued to be supported by the director of the Australian War Memorial, Major General Steve Gower, despite reported criticism of that revisionism by Prime Minister John Howard and the former Leader of the Federal Opposition, Mr Kim Beazley.

Despite the public controversy surrounding Dr Peter Stanley's denial of the gravity of the Japanese threat to Australia in 1942 and his attacks on the leadership and character of Prime Minister Curtin, it has been reported that the Howard Government reappointed Major General Gower for a further term as director of the Memorial on the recommendation of the Council of the Australian War Memorial . Australians need to know whether the Council is happy to see a memorial that belongs to the people of Australia used as a platform from which its staff can express controversial and strongly challenged views that appear to lack sound historical foundation and are likely to cause deep offence to those who respect the wartime leadership of Prime Minister John Curtin and to diminish the achievements and sacrifices of those who died defending Australia from Japanese military aggression.